A Fraction of a Soul?

Julia Sandoval
Dr. Adam Johns
ENGCMP 0200
April 18, 2009

A Fraction of a Soul?

One of the most interesting subjects Lee M. Silver discusses in his book, Challenging Nature, is to what extent conjoined twins are recognized in society; be it as separate persons with a soul, or simply soulless parasites to a fully human host. The matter is difficult, considering how sporadically society must deal with such an issue, but nevertheless it must be determined. In cases to determine if these fractions of persons do in fact have souls, it is necessary to decide if the conjoined body has the function of reason and intelligence or not. Not only is the matter of even the existence of the soul integral to decide if a conjoined twin, or fraction of a person, has one, but it is also important to consider when and how the embryos receive this or these souls. It is my opinion that in the case of a pair of equally fully functioning conjoined twins, they share two souls, but when those twins are unequal in their functions and one is more of a parasitic mass, the more coherent of the two is the twin that contains the soul. Lee’s view on conjoined twins has ignited a great amount of interest in me about the subject, and has led me also to ponder the very issue about when exactly ensoulment even occurs in a person.

The soul is something that makes humans different from just animals. It endows personality, spirit, upon its body. The soul is indistinguishable and cannot be recognized other than through the emotions and reasoning of its host. If the nonfunctioning conjoined twin is unable to reason, defend, or control itself, it is no more than what can be considered a parasite and therefore, it is not worthy of the same rights a fully functioning human being is. If the conjoined twin has an ability to reason or at least defend itself, along with anatomical means to do so, it has a soul.

The soul of these entities, if in fact are one in the same, should bare the same characteristics and personalities of the conjoined host. Even the ever popular notion of “soul mates” has always been regarded as two persons, sharing in them a cohesive and natural bond. This bond is inexplicable, but is manifested in their relations through the emotion of love. This kinship is recognized as two souls that were meant and destined to be together. Now, this all can seem very mythical and that it should belong in a fairytale, but in all reality, it is no more unbelievable than the prospect of a man born with two heads. It is not my intention to imply that the souls be romantically involved, but if a “soul mate” is recognized in each of two beings as sharing the same soul, why is it so hard to recognize the same exact soul in the body of conjoined twins?

If there is only a fraction of a person, is there only a fraction of a soul? And to what extent can it be determined that this person and fraction of a person are connected at all, other than by some body tissue? It’s difficult to differentiate souls within a single body because the degree to which conjoined twins are equal in capabilities must be considered. In the case of Abigail and Brittany Hensel (the two headed, one bodied, fully functioning set of conjoined twins), there is a very strong mental and physical connection, attributed to their sharing the same nervous system. “Evidence of a direct mental connection comes from their eerie ability to read each other’s mind” (Silver 153). Despite this mental and physical connection, it is very well understood that these two girls are in and of themselves separate persons. They have different interests yet still can make their own decisions. They each write with their own hand and give completely different answers on tests and such. They claim to not feel the other side of their body and it is attributed to the fact that each of the Hensel girls has her own nervous system. Each twin also has her own sense of style. From their early childhood, the parents of these unique twins have reiterated that each twin is an individual person. It is very apparent to friends and family that the girls have very different personalities and most of their similarities are only present in their ability to coordinate flawlessly in their actions (Weathers). They are quite talented and in sync with each other. Each controls the half of their body, allowing them to drive, play piano, type at a normal speed, and ride a bike.

Yes, in some cases the extra mass attached to the host is in fact a fully formed, intelligent being. Yet in others it can be as insignificant as a tumor, donning some random pieces of human structure, like teeth or hair or nails, found attached to the other twin, or even inside, as is the case for a fetus-in-fetu, or a teratoma. Either way, the prospect of whether or not these entities have “souls” is both ethically and morally confusing. These entities in my opinion cannot in anyway contain souls as they are parasitic and unable of any human thought. Being deprived of a normal life by their god-given restrictions and shortcomings, the fetus-in-fetu and teratoma were not meant to live, even though their existence was the result of genetic malfunctioning or a random occurrence in the maturation in the womb. The teratoma and fetus-in-fetu do have the same genetic makeup as their more capable counter parts. However, their genetic code has many mutations and is not fully complete; therefore it is inhuman and should not have a soul. If there are so many mutations in the genetic structure, it is basically a different species. Homo sapiens are the only species that we deem human, even though things like worms and monkeys have our same genetic code, with only slight variations making them different. Why would we call anything that is characteristically inhuman to be a fully enabled, cared-carrying person with a soul?

Most people who are uninformed about the facts of conjoined twins would probably be quick to assume that the easiest way to determine if the parasitic entity is capable of human thought would be to consider whether it has a head or not. I agree with Silver in that “Cutting off Abigail’s head would be murder, even if Brittany could keep the rest of the body alive, because Abigail’s mind would be terminated.” However, this head might not be fully developed and might not have a brain. Furthermore, this head might be attached to an otherwise normal human, and be just a parasitic mass that causes more difficulties to the cardiovascular system of the more conscious part of the conjoined pair. If a “being’s” sole purpose in life is to be a nuisance to its twin, what good does that do? During the existence of mankind people have pondered the questions as to why “God, the greater power, supreme being,” would bestow upon its own creation such things as disease, bad luck, and overall hardships. Why would he create a being that does nothing other than to endanger and sometimes prevent the life of its own flesh and blood? This individual, therefore, must not have been meant to live. It is hard to wrap one’s head around the notion that a being was not meant to live, but if its only means of survival is to take away from another’s, it was not fit to survive in the first place.

Sometimes the embryo splits and then reattaches together. This is how conjoined twins are formed, in the cases of a person with an arm growing out of his or her mouth. When the process of becoming conjoined twins begins, the embryo slightly splits in one place; if it were to fully sever, the result would be in twins; if there are two severs: triplets, etc. This split usually occurs within the first two weeks of maturation of the embryo. According to some religions such as Catholicism, the belief is that a soul is provided upon conception. But what would they say in the latter situation? The point of conception for the conjoined part of the embryo simply does not exist. This “conception” that would occur would have to have had occurred after two weeks. This is unnatural and cannot be associated in the same sense as conception.

The Jewish belief about when one acquires his or her soul is based on the passage Genesis in the Bible. However, the same passage in the Bible directs the Catholics’ teachings of the same subject. Catholics believe that one acquires the soul upon conception; referring to the point at which Jesus was conceived in Mary’s body and when she was informed of this occurrence immediately by the angel Gabriel.

According to Silver’s interpretation of the Jewish Religion, the point at which a body receives its soul is at the first breath of life (Silver 10). This would mean then that during the time at which this particular embryo splits, it is not endowed with a soul yet. The point at which it receives its soul is only at the first breath of life. Yet, ironically, it is in keeping with the Jewish belief that abortion is an option within the time that the fetus is inside the mother’s womb; but the interesting part is after the birth. According to the Talmud (a record of rabbinic discussions pertaining to Jewish law and ethics), the fetus is a rodef, an aggressor, against its mother and this is the reason why abortion to save the mother’s life is permitted (Feldman, Dorff, 383). “A principle in the Jewish view of the matter is tza’ara d’gufah kadim, that her welfare, avoidance of her pain, comes first” (Feldman, Dorff, 383). The main point here is that the mother is the first and foremost person considered and protected when impregnated with a child. It is her duty to take care of both herself and her fetus, yet if her fetus endangers her in any way, it must be terminated to prevent harm on the mother. Another aspect that is interesting in the Jewish interpretation of the Ten Commandments is the fifth commandment, “Thou Shalt Not Kill.” The Jewish interpretation takes this to mean that one shall not murder. There is a great controversy over how the connotations of “kill” and “murder” differ. Jewish practice deems that “to kill” means to end a life, in the most innocent sense, be it because of self defense, necessity, or war. It is a different connotation than “to murder,” which is considered an act preventable and performed with the most malicious of intentions. Also, the fetus is hardly considered to even be murdered rather than be killed; in fact it is impossible to murder it, because it is not yet a human person. (Feldman, Dorff 384). “It’s the determination of the culture or the religion that declares not when life begins but when life begins to be human” (Feldman, Dorff, 384).

I have obviously created quite a tangent here in my paper, and while it might seem unnecessary, I think that it is beneficial to talk about abortion because it, like the matter of termination of a disabled conjoined twin, asks the moral question about what constitutes a life before or after a birth. This is of course, the matter of killing a child. Or is it a child? Both scenarios deal with the fact that it is a confusing and moral dilemma to either terminate a child’s life while inside the womb, or to terminate it after its birth in order to prevent death or hardships for the twin or mother. “For the Greater Good,” seems to be the best way to describe my feelings towards both of these issues. In my opinion it is far more beneficial to terminate a life if that very life poses a threat to the twin or to the welfare of the mother in the case of an abortion.

One devout Roman Catholic woman decided, without hesitation, that it would be completely against her religion to abort the fetuses of her conjoined twins. However and unfortunately, these conjoined twins were not the same; Gracie was fully functioning, but her attached sister, Rosie, had a body whose lungs and heart collapsed within a short time after having been born. She was then, at that point, considered a human, yet due to her reliability on her sister’s cardiovascular system, posed an enormous threat on both of their lives. The ethical issue was debated among the doctors, ethicists, and parents.

Lord Justice Ward argued that this act [separation of the twins] was one of ‘quasi self-defense’ (with the doctors acting on Gracie’s behalf). Rosie, he wrote, ‘may have a right to life, but she has little right to be alive. She is alive because and only because, to put it bluntly, but nonetheless accurately, she sucks the lifeblood of [Gracie] and she sucks the lifeblood out of [Gracie] . . . If [Gracie] could speak she would surely protest, "Stop it [Rosie], you’re killing me” (Wootton).

This was the point at which she must be considered a parasitic host. The operation, contrary to the mother’s wishes yet crucial to the survival of Gracie, went on as recommended and resulted in the death of Rosie and a fully normal life for Gracie (Silver 160). From my perspective, it was an outcome of both fate and luck that Gracie had the opportunity to survive. She clearly had a soul, yet was burdened by the parasitic twin. Since Rosie was not fit to survive on her own, it was crucial that she be separated from the body of Gracie. The Catholic teachings justify that the amputation could be attributed to self defense on the more functioning twin’s part. There is no way that she was intended to live and probably did not have a soul. I believe this because to me, and it is something that McKibben discusses, the intention of a human life is to prosper and make worthy of itself. “It is precisely in investing life, love, and labor that we constitute the world as a personal, as the place of intimate dwelling” (McKibben 94). This life that was endowed on Rosie would not fit into this ideal. It did not contribute anything to itself or its surroundings; rather, it took from its twin and served as not only a nuisance, but also a danger.


But what, exactly, is a “parasite?” Any biologist will tell you that a parasite is an organism that grows, feeds, and is sheltered on or in a different organism while contributing nothing to the survival of its host (Dictionary.com). Yet, the tricky aspect concerning whether or not these supposed human beings can ever be attributed to this word, which is usually associated with tapeworms and leeches, lies in their capabilities. These lower life forms do not have a soul, according to both Catholic and Jewish religions. If the “lesser” conjoined twin definitely poses a threat to the healthier, and cannot function as a normal being should, the twin is usually considered somewhat of a “tumor” and is, for lack of a better word, removed. It is contrary to the belief about human existence to even suggest that a fully fledged, living human being of whatever living capacity should be associated with and determined a “parasite.”

The questions to be considered are: What would be done if the child is in fact conjoined, but with a nonfunctioning parasitic host? Is it morally and ethically alright to kill this body? If it were apparent before the birth, there is no doubt that in the Jewish religion it would be reasonable to abort the child(ren). Yet in the aftermath, does the same right hold? Perhaps if the nonfunctioning being was never able to breathe its first breath, for the only factor that would determine its possession of a soul would be this one moment in life.

So technically, by conjoining the two beliefs of the Catholic and Jewish religions, they are reciprocals concerning their perceptions about souls and conjoined twins. If a Catholic embryo (already endowed with a soul) becomes a set of conjoined twins, this second piece of human would not have the soul endowed upon itself during conception. Hence, the soul does not exist for this being and despite their views on abortion, does not technically have the right to live. The Jewish belief, however, deems it plausible that if this extra mass can in fact breathe after being born, no matter how disabled the being is, it would be wrong in their eyes to abort or amputate the mass. So it is ironic that the Catholic Church, being completely against abortion, would be more inclined to terminate the conjoined twin before those of the Jewish religion, even though they have no prohibitions about abortion before the birth.

After having reviewed much of the stages during which an embryo becomes a fetus, and when a fetus becomes a child, I have formed my own opinions about the time at which a fetus becomes human, or in another sense, when signs of independent motion are visible. The fetus starts to make its own movements at about twelve weeks into the pregnancy (WebMD). At this point a fetus’s brain and motor functions are capable of independent, albeit necessary and probably unintentional, movement. The fetus is no longer an embryo and is on its way to become a baby. Also at this stage, the chances of miscarriage are much lower (WebMD), so, by a Jewish perspective, there is much less of a threat to the mother regarding her own health and the health of her unborn child. If there is less of a threat, the baby has more of a right to live and less chance that this particular religion would see fit that it be killed.

As for the implications that arise from my views on what can be deemed “a soul” (i.e. reason, decision making, personality, etc.), it is reasonable to think that my views suggest that I would believe that a man suddenly fallen into a coma (and therefore be conscious and unable to defend himself or think rationally) would have lost his soul; based on my views that a child unfit to reason or defend itself or think rationally would not have been born with a soul. This is not my belief. I do believe the latter, but the former is not what I am implying. Back to what McKibben says about having a full life and striving to enrich it in every way, I believe that this man will have a soul up until the point he dies, during which the soul would leave his body and go into the afterlife. Because he lived a full life, making him human, he always had a soul. In the cases of teratomas, fetus-in-fetu, and non or hardly functioning conjoined twins, I would not believe they had souls due to their absence of any real life experiences and due to their inability to reason or defend themselves.


The prospect of what humans should deem a “soul,” has always been contemplated, among cultures and religions alike. The soul of a twin or conjoined twin also has toyed with the standards of ethics and moralities. But what truly constitutes a soul cannot be attributed solely on the presence of a brain or heart, for these are solitary and can sometimes show up separately, to non functioning beings. Without a soul, we are merely animals, or in some cases, parasites; acting only on animal instinct or living off of a host. Our ability to reason is what differentiates humans from animals, and when that right to a soul is gone, we can only be associated with the latter, no matter how painful that is to say.







Works Cited


Silver, Lee. Challenging Nature: The Clash Between Biotechnology and Spirituality.
New York: HarperCollins, 2007.

Weathers, Helen. "Abigail and Brittany Hensel: an extraordinary bond." Mail Online. 31
Dec. 2006. Associated Newspapers Ltd. 17 Apr. 2009 .

McKibben, B. (2003). Enough. New York: Owl Books.

"Fetal Development Timeline." WebMD. Ed. Hoffman, MD Matt. 28 Oct. 2009. WebMD LLC.
17 Apr. 2009 .

Jones, David A. The Soul of the Embryo. New York: Continuum, 2004.

Feldman, David M., and Sandra B. Lubarsky. "This Matter of Abortion." Contemporary Jewish
Ethics and Morality. Ed. Elliot N. Dorff and Louis E. Newman. New York: Oxford
University Press, 1995.

Wootton, David. "Separating Gracie and Rosie." London Review of Books. 19 Aug. 2004. LRB Ltd. 18 Apr. 2009 .