Monday, April 6, 2009

A Fraction of a Soul?

Julia Sandoval
Dr. Adam Johns
ENGCMP 0200
April 5, 2009

One of the most interesting subjects Lee M. Silver discusses in his book, Challenging Nature, is the prospect about to what extent conjoined twins are recognized in society; be it as separate persons with a soul, or simply soulless parasites to a fully human host. The matter is difficult, considering how sporadically society must deal with such an issue, but nevertheless it must be determined. In cases to determine if these fractions of persons do in fact have souls, it is necessary to decide if the conjoined body has the function of reason and intelligence or not.

The soul is something that makes humans different from just animals. It endows personality, spirit, upon its body. The soul is indistinguishable and cannot be recognized other than through the emotions and reasoning of its host. If the nonfunctioning conjoined twin is unable to reason, defend, or control itself, it is no more than what can be considered an parasite and therefore, it is not worthy of the same rights a fully functioning human being is. If the conjoined twin has an ability to reason or at least defend itself, along with anatomical means to do so, it has a soul.

Contrary to my argument, many primitive and ancient religions view animals as essential soul-bearers. Some contemporary religions such as Buddhism (for example the notion that a person can be reincarnated into a worm) regard animals with great respect. However, in the Buddhist belief, this soul is connected to all other souls, allowing for the reincarnation. Primitive religions often viewed certain animals as entities, endowed with souls; or even as gods. “The pretotemistic soul belief of the Semang and other tribes had the bird as the earliest spirit animal. Here, the bird had to be killed to release the soul and animate the embryo” (Winthuis 1928, 175; Rank 17). Rank later goes on to describe how the people of this particular tribe would only attribute a soul to a person if it had been endowed by either an animal spirit or by a spirit of a deceased family member. Now in this day and age, most people would not associate a soul to any animal. Yes, dog’s are “man’s best friend,” but that is only because they are genetically domesticated to be so.

If there is only a fraction of a person, is there only a fraction of a soul? And to what extent can it be determined that this person and fraction of a person are connected at all, other than by some body tissue? The soul of these entities, if in fact are one in the same, should bare the same characteristics and personalities of the conjoined host. Even the ever popular notion of “soul mates” has always been regarded as two persons, sharing in them a cohesive and natural bond. This bond is inexplicable, but is manifested in their relations through the emotion of love. This kinship is recognized as two souls that were meant and destined to be together. Now, this all can seem very mythical and that it should belong in a fairytale, but in all reality, it is no more unbelievable than the prospect of a man born with two heads. It is not my intention to imply that the souls be romantically involved, but if a “soul mate” is recognized in each of two beings as sharing the same soul, why is it so hard to recognize the same exact soul in the body of conjoined twins?


It’s difficult to do this because it matters to what degree the conjoined twins are equal in capabilities. In the case of Abigail and Brittany Hensel, the two headed, one bodied, fully functioning set of conjoined twins, there is a very strong connection, attributed to their sharing the same nervous system. “Evidence of a direct mental connection comes from their eerie ability to read each other’s mind” (Silver 153). Despite this mental and physical connection, it is very well understood that these two girls are in and of themselves separate persons. They have different interests yet still can make their own decisions. To what point though, does their body allow for distinguishing between the two? A seemingly insignificant question that could be considered is, are they ambidextrous? If not, is it considered cheating when one writes the answers down during a math test? And if it is not, to which twin can the answer be attributed? In the case of Abigail and Brittany Hensel, they are in fact ambidextrous; which is an understatement in respect to how talented and in sync with each other they really are. Each controls the half of their body, allowing them to drive, play piano, type at a normal speed, and ride a bike.

Yes, in some cases the extra mass attached to the host is in fact a fully formed, intelligent being. Yet in others it can be as insignificant as a tumor, donning some random pieces of human structure, like teeth or hair or nails, found attached to the other twin, or even inside, as is the case for a fetus-in-fetu, or a teratoma. Either way, the prospect of whether or not these entities have “souls” is both ethically and morally confusing.

Most people who are uninformed about the facts of conjoined twins would probably be quick to assume that the easiest way to determine if the parasitic entity is capable of human thought would be to consider whether it has a head or not. I agree with Silver in that “Cutting off Abigail’s head would be murder, even if Brittany could keep the rest of the body alive, because Abigail’s mind would be terminated.” However, this head might not be fully developed and might not have a brain. Furthermore, this head might be attached to an otherwise normal human, and be just a parasitic mass that causes more difficulties to the cardiovascular system of the more conscious part of the conjoined pair. If a “being’s” sole purpose in life is to be a nuisance to its twin, what good does that do? During the existence of mankind people have pondered the questions as to why “God, the greater power, supreme being,” would bestow upon its own creation such things as disease, bad luck, and overall hardships. Why would he create a being that does nothing other than to endanger and sometimes prevent the life of its own flesh and blood? This individual, therefore, must not have been meant to live. It is hard to wrap one’s head around the notion that a being was not meant to live, but if its only means of survival is to take away from another’s, it was not fit to survive in the first place.

The word “to conjoin” means simply to join-with. This is strange because there is not usually a joining of embryos. Sometimes the embryo splits and then reattaches together. This is how conjoined twins are formed, in the cases of a person with an arm growing out of his or her mouth. When the process of becoming conjoined twins begins, the embryo slightly splits in one place; if it were to fully sever, the result would be in twins; if there are two severs: triplets, etc. This split usually occurs within the first two weeks of maturation of the embryo. According to some religions such as Catholicism, the belief is that a soul is provided upon conception. But what would they say in the latter situation? The point of conception for the conjoined part of the embryo simply does not exist. This “conception” that would occur would have to have had occurred after two weeks. This is unnatural and cannot be associated in the same sense as conception.

The Jewish belief about when one acquires his or her soul is based on the passage Genesis in the Bible. However, the same passage in the Bible directs the Catholics’ teachings of the same subject. Catholics believe that one requires the soul upon conception; referring to the point at which Jesus was conceived in Mary’s body and when she was informed of this occurrence immediately by the angel Gabriel.

According to Silver’s interpretation of the Jewish Religion, the point at which a body receives its soul is at the first breath of life (Silver 10). This would mean then, that during the time at which this particular embryo splits, it is not endowed with a soul yet. The point at which it receives its soul is only at the first breath of life. Yet, ironically, it is in keeping with the Jewish belief that abortion is an option within the time that the fetus is inside the mother’s womb; but the interesting part is after the birth. What would be done if the child is in fact conjoined, but with a nonfunctioning parasitic host? Is it morally and ethically alright to kill this body? If it were apparent before the birth, there is no doubt that in the Jewish religion it would be reasonable to abort the child(ren). Yet in the aftermath, does the same right hold? Perhaps if the nonfunctioning being was never able to breathe its first breath, for the only factor that would determine its possession of a soul would be this one moment in life. So technically, by conjoining the two beliefs of the Catholic and Jewish religions, they are reciprocals concerning their perceptions about souls and conjoined twins. If a Catholic embryo (already endowed with a soul) becomes a set of conjoined twins, this second piece of human would not have the soul endowed upon itself during conception. Hence, the soul does not exist for this being and despite their views on abortion, does not technically have the right to live. The Jewish belief, however, deems it plausible that if this extra mass can in fact breathe after being born, no matter how immaterial the being is, it would be wrong in their eyes to abort or amputate the mass. So it is ironic that the Catholic church, being completely against abortion, would be more inclined to terminate the conjoined twin before those of the Jewish religion, even though they have no prohibitions about abortion before the birth.

One devout Roman Catholic woman decided, without hesitation, that it would be completely against her religion to abort the fetuses of her conjoined twins. However and unfortunately, these conjoined twins were not the same; Gracie was fully functioning, but her attached sister, Rosie, had a body whose lungs and heart collapsed within a short time after having been born. She was then, at that point, considered a human, yet due to her reliability on her sister’s cardiovascular system, posed an enormous threat on both of their lives. This was the point at which she must be considered a parasitic host. The operation, contrary to the mother’s wishes yet crucial to the survival of Gracie, went on as recommended and resulted in the death of Rosie and a fully normal life for Gracie (Silver 160). From my perspective, it was an outcome of both fate and luck that Gracie had the opportunity to survive. She clearly had a soul, yet was burdened by the parasitic twin. Since Rosie was not fit to survive on her own, it was crucial that she be separated from the body of Gracie. There is no way that she was intended to live and probably did not have a soul.

But what, exactly, is a “parasite?” Any biologist will tell you that a parasite is an organism that grows, feeds, and is sheltered on or in a different organism while contributing nothing to the survival of its host (Dictionary.com). Yet, the tricky aspect concerning whether or not these supposed human beings can ever be attributed to this word, which is usually associated with tapeworms and leeches, lies in their capabilities. These lower life forms do not have a soul, according to both Catholic and Jewish religions. If the “lesser” conjoined twin definitely poses a threat to the healthier, and cannot function as a normal being should, the twin is usually considered somewhat of a “tumor” and is, for lack of a better word, removed. It is contrary to the belief about human existence to even suggest that a fully fledged, living human being of no matter what living capacity should be associated with and determined a “parasite.”

The prospect of what humans should deem a “soul,” has always been contemplated, among cultures and religions alike. The soul of a twin or conjoined twin also has toyed with the standards of ethics and moralities. But what truly constitutes a soul cannot be attributed solely on the presence of a brain or heart, for these are solitary and can sometimes show up separately, to non functioning beings. Without a soul, we are merely animals, or in some cases, parasites; acting only on animal instinct or living off of a host. Our ability to reason is what differentiates humans from animals, and when that right to a soul is gone, we can only be associated with the latter, no matter how painful that is to say.



Works Cited
Silver, Lee. Challenging Nature: The Clash Between Biotechnology and Spirituality.New York: HarperCollins, 2007.

Rank, Otto. Psychology and The Soul: A Study of the Origin, Conceptual Evolution, and Nature of the Soul. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998.

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